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Abstract 
The rapid pace of development in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) over the last 30 
years has changed the way the rail industry operates. Commercial pressures and the need to share 
operational information between stakeholders to facilitate cross-border services etc. have gradually 
pushed the industry away from more expensive, bespoke systems and towards Commercial Off The 
Shelf (COTS) solutions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of industrial control, where 
examples of the move to standard technologies include the European Train Control System (ETCS) in 
the signalling domain, and the provision of remote condition monitoring via Supervisory Control And 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks. 
Although the move away from bespoke systems has allowed the industry to become more agile, reduce 
the risks of vendor lock-in, and deliver “more for less” in terms of underlying investment, it also risks 
increasing the attractiveness of the railways to cyber attackers; much of the off-the-shelf hardware is IP 
based, and therefore subject to many of the same attack mechanisms as any other modern ICT system. 
Furthermore, common platforms share common vulnerabilities, meaning exploits that have been 
realised in one industrial sector, such as the Stuxnet worm used to damage Iran’s nuclear centrifuges in 
2010, could in theory now be used to attack PLCs used on the railways in the same way. 
While the rail industry in the UK and worldwide recognises that there will be an increased risk of cyber 
attack in coming years, many railway undertakings are unsure of how to begin building an 
understanding of the extent of the problem they face, or the steps required to address it. Traditional 
threat analysis techniques used in cyber security research frequently require large amounts of detailed 
information on specific systems to be gathered before they can be applied, and cyber security 
specialists speak a different language to rail industry ICT professionals making it difficult to prioritise 
available resources. 
This paper presents outcomes from the SCEPTICS project, an EPSRC funded initiative that is 
developing a set of common processes that can be applied by ICT professionals within the rail industry 
to scope their own industrial control systems, allowing them to get a broad understanding of the 
potential risks of cyber attack, and delivering sets of priority areas / systems to investigate using more 
detailed threat analysis tools and approaches. 
1. Introduction 
An Industrial Control System (ICS) is defined by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
as “…a general term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system 
configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) often found in the industrial 
sectors and critical infrastructures” (NIST, 2011). Put simply, an ICS is a set of sensors, actuators and 
control software that monitor and operate real-world infrastructure, such as a power station, a 
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production line, or a transport network. Because of their potential to impact on the physical world ICS 
pose unique challenges from the perspective of cyber security, and as a result the methods needed to 
defend them against attacks are less well understood than in conventional ICT systems. The 
motivations behind cyber attacks on ICS are also complex; the presence of real-world infrastructure in 
the system means that in many cases a physical attack can be a more straightforward method of 
causing disruption to service, but the impacts of such an attack are also easier to identify and recover 
from. Cyber attacks by comparison require specialist knowledge to implement, but can lie dormant for 
long periods before being triggered, and it can be much harder to guarantee a successful resolution / 
removal / “clean up” after an attack. 
Although it can be hard to gather specific technical details on the nature of successful cyber attacks 
against ICS, often due to commercial sensitivities or the need to protect similar systems from the same 
attack vector, the existence of such attacks is well documented as is the potential extent of the damage 
that can result. In 2012 the Shamoon malware virus infected the business systems of the Saudi Aramco 
oil company. Although the attack did not directly target critical oil production ICS, it wiped 33,000 – 
55,000 workstations at the organisation. It is believed that the attack had indirect consequences on oil 
production and severe financial repercussions (Mackenzie, 2012). An analysis of the virus found that 
the creators were skilled, but amateurs and that the system had been infected by a disgruntled insider 
through a USB key (Tarakanov, 2012). There is a need for the rail industry to be better prepared for 
attacks on business systems as well as safety-critical ICS. In December of 2011, a railway company in 
the US Pacific Northwest was attacked over a period of two days, suffering disruption to its signalling 
system, resulting in a 15-minute delay to service. Perhaps most disturbingly, a post-incident analysis 
suggested that far from being a targeted attack aimed at halting services on the transport network, the 
delay was in fact the result of a random incident (Zetter, 2012). In 2014 it was reported that a steel mill 
in Germany had suffered “massive” damage when a cyber attack prevented a blast furnace from 
shutting down correctly (Zetter, 2015). The attackers had gained access to industrial control systems 
through a spear-phishing attack on the business network. They had subsequently been able explore the 
company’s networks and access systems controlling industrial processes. The attack highlights the 
danger of presuming that business networks and industrial control systems are not connected, or that 
an “air gap” exists between them (Byres, 2012). 
The Cyber Security Challenge Facing the Rail Industry 
The railways are a classic example of a large scale ICS. Comprising both cyber (ICT, communications 
networks, and control software) and physical (sensors and actuators) system components, which are 
geographically dispersed over a wide area, the railways are a technologically diverse environment with 
a complex set of systems interfaces. As a well-established legacy system, where in the past security 
was primarily guaranteed by private networks that were physically isolated from outside world by “air 
gaps”, the Internet age means the railway industry is faced with the daunting challenge of identifying 
potential areas of cyber security vulnerability, and prioritising those areas where mitigating action should 
take place given the resources available. 
In common with the operators of many other long established ICS, there is a recognition from 
stakeholder organisations within the railways that cyber security is a major challenge to the industry 
going forwards, however many do not know where to begin quantifying and addressing the risk. The 
history of the UK rail industry has led to a particularly challenging ICT landscape, with the 2011 report 
into the value for money offered by the UK rail industry reporting that around 1,700 separate information 
systems were in use by the industry at that time (DfT, 2011). Despite the technical and commercial 
challenges, over the last five years the industry has been making significant steps in delivering a 
focussed vision for cyber security. 
In 2012, the Rail Safety and Standards Board published a cross-industry technical strategy for UK rail. 
As a high-level document, the Rail Technical Strategy (RTS) is understandably light on technical details, 
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however it does recommend that “…all information systems must be resilient to cyber attacks…” and 
that “…system security should be maintained and continually checked and tested…” (RSSB, 2012). The 
following year, Network Rail’s own Technical Strategy (NRTS, 2013) referred directly to the need for 
investment in cyber security, placing an indicative figure of between £1 million and £10 million on 
developing secure information resources and telecoms over Control Period 5 (2014 – 2019). More 
recently, at the Institute of Risk Management’s 2014 Cyber Risk Summit in London, Network Rail’s 
Professional Head of Cyber Security stated that “[Currently] it is far too difficult to carry out a cyber 
attack which would have a significant impact on the running of the railway, but we recognise that won’t 
always be the case. The physical threat will remain, but cyber security will be a major issue in the next 
three to five years” (Finnegan, 2014). 
It is clear based on statements of this type that the rail industry is both aware of the risks posed to their 
ICS by cyber attacks, and keen to take steps to mitigate those risks; however, there is a lack of formal 
processes outlining the appropriate next steps. Should investment be focussed on newer, but unproven, 
connected technologies that are secure by design, or protecting legacy systems which were never 
intended to be connected to the internet? What is the most significant business risk of a successful 
attack – reputational damage to the industry, the loss of sensitive data, or potentially even loss of life? 
Where might be the best financial investment for securing systems? 
Traditional cyber threat analysis techniques typically require the provision of large amounts of 
information on the target systems to be gathered by cyber security professionals before detailed 
evaluations of the domain can take place. However, determining which information about the domain 
needs to be captured is a complex task and this is particularly true in the case of ICS, where factors 
including the presence of custom built, legacy hardware mean systems are far more difficult to 
characterise than the more traditional back-office ICT systems now commonplace in organisations 
worldwide. Adding to this problem is the differing, and often conflicting, use of language between the 
ICS domain experts (e.g. railway professionals) and the cyber security experts. The combination of 
these factors mean that requiring cyber security experts to perform the initial assessment of all the ICT 
systems in a domain of interest can be an inefficient and resource hungry task. 
The SCEPTICS project, part of the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) 
funded Research Institute for Trustworthy Industrial Control Systems (RITICS), aims to address this 
problem by providing a set of standard processes and tools that can be applied by industry ICT staff to 
identify and prioritise areas of their infrastructure at risk from cyber attack; this list can then be used by 
cyber security experts to perform more targeted, detailed assessments of the critical systems. The 
processes are being developed in conjunction with stakeholders in the UK rail industry, but are 
designed to be applicable in any industrial control context. Rail was selected as the main focus for the 
work due to a range of factors, including the complexity of the existing infrastructure, the low level of 
maturity in this area relative to other infrastructure systems (e.g. oil and gas), and the current high level 
of interest from stakeholders. 
2. A Process for Early Assessment of Cyber Risks 
This section presents an overview of the SCEPTICS process, which has been designed to support 
organisations working within the UK rail industry to make an early assessment of their systems for 
potential cyber vulnerabilities. It is aimed at developing a broad understanding of risk areas before an 
organisation invests in more detailed cyber analysis. The process is based on the philosophy that cyber 
security efforts in the context of ICS should not be restricted to known critical systems of interest (e.g. 
ETCS), but that cyber threats should be considered as part of the broader context of an organisation. 
The proposed process is made up of three distinct phases, named: Identify, Describe, and Assess. 
Although shown in this document at a very high level, the complete process each phase is presented as 
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a set of UML activity diagrams, alongside appropriate guidance on methods of information capture and 
the structuring of outputs. 
	
Figure	1:	High	level	overview	of	the	SCEPTICS	process. 
Stage 1: Identify 
The first stage of the process is used to identify which business processes, and therefore which 
systems, are critical to an organisation’s purpose / function. Through the performance of this exercise, it 
is expected that a stakeholder will identify components of its business network that are more critical to 
security than originally believed. This phase can be carried out without the need for a cyber security 
specialist. 
Example: Railway maintenance company M depends heavily on the safety and reliability of its 
maintenance equipment, but also on knowing and correctly applying the maintenance regimes of 
different stakeholders. The maintenance regime information is stored on the business network and is 
used to manage rotas, equipment distribution, invoicing, and to record the condition of all of the 
stakeholder’s safety-critical systems. 
If the business network were to be hacked, data on the condition of safety-critical systems may become 
corrupted, leading to inadequate or inappropriate maintenance being carried out. The longer-term 
consequences of this breach would be likely to include financial and reputational damage. 
Stage one of the SCEPTICS process includes the following activities: 
• Receive an instruction to assess or investigate cyber security threats to a particular 
organisation; 
• State the purpose of the stakeholder wishing to carry out a cyber security assessment; 
• Describe business critical activities; 
• Identify priority activities. 
Stage 2: Describe 
In the second stage of the process, the identified priority activities are described in a way which is 
understood by both railway specialists and cyber security experts. This phase can also be carried out 
without the need for a Cyber Security specialist. 
5	
	
Stage two of the SCEPTICS process includes the following activities: 
• Describe the systems that are needed to carry out the activity. These might include physical 
systems, people, IT systems, or anything which converts information during the process; 
• Describe interactions (used to transfer/convert information during the process); 
• Describe information (transferred during the process. E.g. train number or time); 
• Identify other interactions (very important for understanding potential routes to business critical 
systems. For example: Although it is not part of the NR track access process, the employee 
leave request process depends on information in the track access database); 
• Describe security measures on interactions (e.g. the train number might be encrypted or a 
firewall may be in place); 
• Ensure all interactions are identified. 
Stage 3: Assess 
The third and final stage of the process focusses on the initial threat assessment the systems, 
interactions and information which were captured in stages 1 and 2 of the process. Cyber security 
specialists may be engaged at this stage in order to ensure an effective handover to more in-depth 
system-specific evaluations. 
This phase includes the following activities: 
• Determine whether all interactions have a security measure (e.g. encryption, firewalls etc.); 
• Asses the reliability of the security measures (engage with cyber security specialists); 
• Determine whether the business network is separated from the business critical process; 
• Assess the security of the administration interface for control systems (e.g. can users access 
the USB drive? Do they use it to charge mobile phones? Do they access their emails on the 
interface? Can the situation be made more secure?). 
3. Conclusion 
The risks posed to ICS from cyber attacks are very real, and although to date the number of attacks 
known to have resulted in physical damage to infrastructure is comparably small, reputational damage, 
financial penalties (for example as a result of delays to service), and loss of sensitive data are all 
serious concerns. ICS owners are, generally speaking, becoming aware of the risks posed by cyber 
attacks to their infrastructure, however many are unsure as to how to secure their complex webs of 
sensors, actuators, and software against such threats. 
The necessity to capture significant amounts of domain-specific knowledge before a high-level cyber 
threat assessment of an ICS is unavoidable, however it is less certain that this work must be performed 
by cyber security experts. Instead, the SCEPTICS project team believe it is quite feasible for domain 
experts, who already possess much of the knowledge of the physical and ICT systems needed, to 
perform these early-stage assessments themselves, producing prioritised lists of key systems based on 
the core business functions of the organisations involved. 
The SCEPTICS project is producing early stage cyber risk assessment processes for ICS. These have 
initially been developed in collaboration with railway industry stakeholders in the UK, and the team are 
currently investigating routes for engagement with other railways in Europe and further afield. Moving 
forward, the SCEPTICS processes will be validated and refined with stakeholders in other similar 
industrial domains (initially in the context of the power distribution), ensuring that they are as complete 
and widely applicable as possible within the ICS context. 
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